On sharks, trolls, and their patent prey—Unrealistic damage awards and firms’ strategies of “being i
Cite
36 Research Policy 134
Year
2007
Bluebook cite
Reitzig, Markus Et. Al., On Sharks, Trolls, And Their Patent Prey—Unrealistic Damage Awards And Firms’ Strategies Of “Being Infringed, 36 Research Policy 134 (Feb. 2007)
Patent trolls (or sharks) are patent holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intensive manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms and large manufacturers within a theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably. Copyright 2007 Elsevier